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Abstract Our technologies have enabled us to change both the world and our
perceptions of the world, as well as to change ourselves and to find new ways to
fulfil the human desire for improvement and for having new capacities. The debate
around using technology for human enhancement has already raised many ethical
concerns, however little research has been done in how human enhancement can
affect human communication. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether some
human enhancements could change our shared lifeworld so radically that human
communication as we know it would not be possible any longer. After exploring the
kinds of communication problems we are concerned with as well as mentioning
some possible enhancement interventions that could bring about such problems, we
will address some of the ethical implications that follow from these potential
communication problems. We argue that because of the role that communication
plays in human society, this issue deserves attention.
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‘‘The way we communicate with others and with ourselves ultimately determines the quality of our lives’’.
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Introduction: Why Human Communication Deserves Attention
Communication matters for meaningful human lives. Human communication, in its
different forms, matters because it sets a common ground for meeting common
basic human needs, such as the need to belong and the need to be recognized by
others (Maslow 1943). It also matters because humans have evolved as social
creatures, herd animals. We are gregarious and like to live in groups. Communi-
cation enables us to be social beings. Very few of us are rugged individualists who
put autonomy above most else. And for groups to be successful there must be
communication between the members and successful communication requires a
solid base of shared experiences and beliefs.
With the proliferation of emerging (National Research Council 2008)/converging
(Roco and Bainbridge 2003)/enabling (Nordmann 2004) and often disruptive (Council
2009) technologies (such as nanotechnology, neurotechnology and synthetic biology),
the scope for changing both the world and ourselves has expanded and the desire for
improving or changing particular human capacities and features has become
controversial (Coenen et al. 2009; Farah and Wolpe 2004; Turner and Sahakian 2006).
The debate around the use of technology for human enhancement has already raised
many ethical concerns, for instance, with respect to health and safety, coercion and
autonomy, fairness, dignity and human nature. With human enhancement becoming
an increasingly important topic, more research exploring whether human enhance-
ment might lead to communication problems is warranted. One communication
problem in the framework of the debate on ethical issues surrounding enhancement
technologies,1 is that suggested by Parens (2005). Parens has argued in relation to the
ambivalence found in the debate about enhancement technologies that the ambiva-
lence is the result of different understandings and views about moral ideals held by the
critics and proponents of these technologies. While this can be regarded as a
communication problem, these differences in ethical frameworks are not the ones that
we aim to address in this paper. However, they clearly illustrate the consequences that
different understandings could have for meaningful human communication.
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether some human enhancements could
change our shared lifeworld so radically that human communication as we know it
would not be possible any longer. After exploring the kinds of communication
problems we are concerned with as well as mentioning some possible human
enhancement interventions that could bring about such problems, we will address
some of the ethical implications. We argue that because of the role that
communication plays in human society, this issue deserves attention.
Human Enhancement and Communication
Humans have different forms and degrees of interactions with technology and some
of these interactions have changed the nature of human communication and have
1 Here and in what follows we will be referring to the tools, methods, or substances used for the purposes
of human enhancement as enhancement technologies (Coenen et al. 2009; Elliott 2003).
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done so for a very long time (e.g. smoke signals and computer networks). Our
argument here rests on the fact that certain forms of human communication depend
on a shared lifeworld which in turn depends on similar bodies, perceptual equipment
and socially embedded nature (Passer et al. 2005). In relation to human
enhancement, our argument is not that all human enhancements will lead to
communication problems nor even that those that do will lead to insurmountable
problems. Our aim is the more modest one of arguing that there is an issue here that
deserves serious consideration.
Before proceeding, it is important to spell out what we are referring to when
we say a shared lifeworld or common ground. Here we are not merely referring
to common knowledge or common ways of perceiving the world, instead we
have in mind the idea of a shared point of view2 as used by Thomas Nagel, or a
‘shared lifeworld’3 as used by Husserl (1970). In what follows, we will use the
term ‘shared lifeworld’, following Nagel’s and Husserl’s views, to refer to the
idea that it is through a set of shared values, abilities, beliefs, knowledge,
perceptions, and other social and psychological factors that current humans build
up meaning about the world and themselves and create and maintain meaningful
social relationships.
In spite of some differences in our shared lifeworlds we still can attain partial
understandings, in which the more subjective viewpoints of individuals play no
role in the apprehension of the shared lifeworld. For instance by sharing a
‘lifeworld’ you can grasp ‘what it is like to be on a roller coaster’, however, as
Nagel has argued a human ‘shared lifeworld’ would not be useful when trying to
grasp ‘what is it like to be a bat’ (Nagel 1974). We do not have a shared
lifeworld with bats. We, as human beings, cannot really know what it would be
like to be a bat, he claims (we will argue later that this claim is a little strong).4
This idea was also reflected in Ludwig Wittgenstein remark: ‘‘if a lion could
talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it’’ (Wittgenstein 1953: 227). This claim
has been much criticised but makes sense in terms of his accounts of language
games and forms of life. A lion has a different form of life from a human and in
Wittgensteinian terms would not share enough with a human for them to
understand each other. Their languages would be incommensurable. This may be
a bit of an overstatement too, given that humans and lions are both mammals
and so do have quite a lot in common but the general point is not without some
force. They lead very different lives from humans, have a different body shape
and most likely have at least some different perceptions from us. Arguably, it is
2 According to Nagel (1974) points of view are shaped by values, beliefs, education, and other social and
psychological factors (Nagel 1974).
3 The term has been used widely by Habermas (1987) as the set of skills, competencies, knowledge and
perceptions used by humans in order to negotiate their way through everyday life, that is to say by
interacting with other people, understanding and manipulating their environments (physical and social)
and themselves, differentiating distinct entities and events in the world, and ultimately creating and
maintaining meaningful social relationships (Habermas 1987).
4 We can imagine what would be like for me to behave as a bat, but not what it is like for a bat to be a bat
(Nagel 1974). In that sense we are restricted to our biological and historical resources, and as such it is
beyond our ability to conceive what it is like to be a bat.
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because of this same reason that if we manage to create strong artificial
intelligence embedded in robots, this might still not be sufficient to attain the
type of shared lifeworld with those robots that would be needed to establish
meaningful human communication.
These examples highlight the importance of having a particular kind of body,
perceptual equipment and social nature to establish meaning and understanding
in communication. It is not only that ‘‘our own experience provides the basic
material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited’’ (Nagel 1974,
n.a.), but also that certain kinds of experiences are not accessible to us by the
limits of our own human condition.5 The problem is not confined to exotic cases,
the subjective character of experience of a blind person from birth is not
accessible to me, nor presumably is mine to him or her.6 In this regard we are
not so worried about the differences in perception arising from individual
differences. There will always be a private component of experience, which is
not only that each one of us possesses a particular view, but that nobody really
knows whether other people also have the same internal experiences as we do.
Thus, it might be reasonable to think that some people have one sensation of red
and another group of individuals a different one (Wittgenstein 1953).7 I might
see the colour of this wall as being red, while you might think is more close to
orange. But the idea is that this kind of subjective difference (in this case of
colour perception) still allows for understanding and is not particularly important.
Our claim is that the more alike our shared lifeworlds are the easier it is to
understand and establish meaningful communication, and the less alike they are
the harder it is to communicate. If this is true, one could imagine some future
human enhancement interventions which could change so drastically the
lifeworld of the enhanced individuals that they could no longer reach
understanding and establish meaningful communication with unenhanced indi-
viduals. While we still do not have empirical evidence of the kind of human
enhancement interventions needed for such a dramatic lifeworld shift, there are
some parallels that can be made in relation to communication problems arising
from enhancement. In the next section we will point out three forms of human
enhancement that could challenge aspects of our shared lifeworld and could
potentially affect communication.
5 There would be of course still be private experiences that are accessible to only a particular individual,
but we are concerned with the type of facts that we qua humans can have access to in general terms, and
which are as such not limited to one’s own individual private experiences of the world.
6 We might have partial understanding of certain facts, but not the kind of understanding that would be
needed for meaningful human communication. However, up to certain level of meaning we could try to
develop concepts that could be used to explain the objective facts of the world we live in.
7 Wittgeinstein also uses the case of feeling pain as an experience in which in principle we can imagine
someone else’s pain on the model of our own experience of pain. Although he also pointed out that this is
already not an easy thing to do since ‘‘I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain
which I do feel’’ (1953: 101). So even though one can empathize with someone else’s pain one still would
not be able to experience that person’s pain (we can think for instance that they might be more sensitive to
pain than I am or a difference like that).
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Three Kinds of Enhancement: Body, Senses, Cognition
We already have examples where communication seems to be limited by not
sharing a lifeworld and cases where it is difficult to reach understanding. The natural
world is a good example of the different forms and channels of communication
which are not fully accessible to human understanding. We might claim to have
some understanding of animals that show certain high cognitive capacities (for
instance when they are suffering or in pain) but these are not sufficient conditions to
reach higher levels of communication. The same would probably be true if we were
to establish communication in an efficient and meaningful way with an alien form of
life. Some forms of human enhancement, as briefly described above, may be so
radical that enhanced individuals could be unable to fully communicate with
unenhanced individuals. Here we explore three kinds of modifications that could
lead to such communication problems.
Body
Children’s storybooks abound with stories of animals and humans talking happily
with each other and, apparently, understanding without any problems what each
other is talking about. Carroll was aware that the real situation might not be so
unproblematic. Consider the following two extracts of Alice’s conversation with the
Caterpillar (Carroll 1998: Ch 5):
‘I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, sir’ said Alice, ‘because I’m not myself,
you see.’
‘I don’t see,’ said the Caterpillar.
‘I’m afraid I can’t put it more clearly,’ Alice replied very politely, ‘for I can’t
understand it myself to begin with; and being so many different sizes in a day
is very confusing.’
‘It isn’t,’ said the Caterpillar.
….
‘What size do you want to be?’ it asked.
‘Oh, I’m not particular as to size,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘only one doesn’t like
changing so often, you know.’
‘I don’t know,’ said the Caterpillar.
In the first, Alice’s problem of not knowing who she is stems at least partly from
the fact that she has frequently changed size, something that she finds confusing.
Little girls do not normally change size quickly. For the Caterpillar, changing size,
in the sense of length, is a common affair; it happens every time that he moves. For
him it is not confusing. In the second the theme is continued with the Caterpillar
asserting that he does not know that one does not like changing size frequently. He
almost certainly likes it. So while Alice and the Caterpillar communicate fairly well,
Carroll points out one area where they cannot understand each other. Their
experiences are just too different and they are different because of their bodily
characteristics. The main point of this example, that bodies are important in
communication, should come as no surprise. We experience the world through our
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bodies so obviously they shape our lifeworld. That creatures with radically different
bodies should experience the world differently and therefore have some difficulties
communicating seems self-evident. The caterpillar regularly experiences rapid
changes in its length so finds it commonplace and cannot understand Alice’s
confusion. Alice, on the other hand, never before having experienced rapid changes
in the length of her body, is quite perturbed. Size, for humans, is a relatively
important part of one’s self-identity. That is why Alice says ‘‘I’m not myself, you
see.’’ The caterpillar of course ‘‘can’t see’’ because rapid changes in length of his
body cause no self-identity problems. The point here for our discussion of human
enhancement is that some bodily enhancements could lead to the sorts of
communication difficulties that arose for Alice and the caterpillar. Modifications to
our bodies and to the pace of changes in our bodies could have a significant impact
on our lifeworld.
Senses
Frogs only see movement. Saying to a frog ‘that moved’ wouldn’t make much sense
to the frog, and your pet fly would be bored if you took it to the movies because it
would see it as a slide show, and bats use echolocation, something for which we do
not have adequate perceptual apparatus. In all of these cases, if we could talk with
the frog, fly and bat, our communication would be limited, or so it seems.
In the human case too there are several examples where different levels of or
complete lack of certain senses raise questions whether or not meaningful
communication can be achieved. Consider the case of colour blindness (CB). Most
CB people can make most of the distinctions that non-CB people can. Thus, in most
cases it probably does not present much of a communication problem. However, if
we think about how poets evoke emotions when talking about the intense red colour
of a rose or the changing tones of a sunset then it is plausible to think that some
human enhancement in relation to adding or enhancing a sense could open a gap of
understanding between enhanced and unenhanced individuals. Even though not all
sense enhancements might lead to communication problems, the possibility should
not be overlooked.
Another example to help us understand if human enhancement would cause
communication problems is to consider communication between the sighted and the
blind. If the enhancement is enhancement of a sense or of enabling a new sense,
then the difference between the enhanced and the unenhanced, at first glance looks
similar to that between the sighted and the non-sighted but it is not quite so
straightforward. To make this point clearer we will first look at a discussion between
Bryan Magee, a sighted philosopher and Martin Milligan, a blind philosopher
(Magee and Milligan 1998). This example suggests that communication problems
between the sighted and the non-sighted might not be great. We will then consider a
short story by H. G. Wells that suggests differently. This will enable us to give a
qualified defence of the claim that the difference between the enhanced and the
unenhanced is similar to that between the sighted and the non-sighted.
Milligan believes that the blind can do just about everything that the sighted can,
though not always as quickly. Both can, for example talk about the external world and
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the blind can understand this in a similar way to the sighted. Magee doubts this. The
difference between them can be demonstrated by considering the two Frank Jacksons
(1982).8 Jackson1 believed that the Mary of the black and white room would know
more about colour etc. when she emerged into the outside world than she did while still
in the room. Jackson2 believes that she would not. Jackson1 held that the phenomenal
aspect of vision provided extra knowledge to the purely scientific, materialist aspect
while Jackson2 believes that if we know and understand all of the physics then we
know all that is to be known. The phenomenal adds nothing. Magee seems to hold
Jackson1’s view and Milligan, Jackson2’s. On Milligan’s view, blindness would not be
much of a barrier to communication with a sighted person. Both can have access to the
same knowledge. For Magee however, there is an insurmountable problem. The blind
do not have access to all of the knowledge that the sighted do. It is not obvious
however, that serious communication problems arise even if Magee is right. He and
Milligan can discuss the external world meaningfully even if their phenomenal
experiences are different. Those differences seem little more significant than me
seeing what you call green when I see red. The phenomenal differences may be there
but they have little impact on communication between us.
Now to the second case, the short story by H.G. Wells The Country of the Blind
(Wells 2006). In this story a young man, Nunez, fell into a valley in the Andes that
had been cut off from the outside world for many generations. The inhabitants had
gradually lost their sight and eventually all were blind and nobody remembered
anything about sight. In this valley Nunez was not well understood and could
communicate nothing about sight to the inhabitants in the way that Magee could
communicate something about it to Milligan. The relevant difference is that
Milligan lived in a sighted community, could use that community’s language and
was well aware that the majority of people could do various things faster and easier
than he could. The valley inhabitants however had no reason to believe that Nunez
had a way of experiencing the world that they lacked. Anything that he could do,
they could do and many things they could do much better.9 When he did talk of
seeing colours and so on they had no reason to believe him. Here the lack of
communication was significant, at least for Nunez.10
What follows for human enhancement and communication? The claim was that
the sighted versus non-sighted case was similar to the enhanced versus non-
enhanced one. In the first example, the communication between Magee and Milligan
did not seem great while in the second, the sighted Nunez had insurmountable
communication difficulties. We suggested that the relevant difference was that
Milligan had always lived in a sighted community and understood its use of
language. Nunez on the other hand, could not make his sightedness understood
because the community into which he fell, had no concept at all of what it was to
8 In this paper Jackson uses the case of Mary who knows everything about the science of colour but has
never actually ‘experienced’ seeing colours because she is forced to investigate the world from a black
and white room via a black and white television monitor.
9 For instance these people could lead nocturnal lifestyles without having to depend on special
infrastructure.
10 If a few humans were enhanced with a new sense perhaps the situation would be more like this than
like the blind in our society.
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see. A reasonable claim is that lacking a sense in a community in which the vast
majority have it, does not raise insurmountable problems for communication,
providing that one is part of that language community. Having a sense that all or
most others lack, creates greater difficulties and this would be the more common
case with enhancements. The possibilities seem to be that the enhanced in this
situation would either be ostracised in the way that Nunez was or perhaps more
likely, would form an elite. We will now look a little more at what it might be like to
have a new sense.
It is a bit difficult to imagine what it would be like to have a new sense, so
considering the example of echolocation may help. Echolocation, as mentioned
previously, is used by bats to perceive the external world. By determining how long
it takes the reflections of their high-frequency shrieks to return from objects within
range, bats determine how far away an object is. A bat can also determine through
echolocation where an object is, how big it is and in what direction it is moving. In
order for bats to perceive using echolocation, their brains need to be designed to
make sense of the inputs received by it. In his paper ‘What it is like to be a bat’,
Nagel (1974) argues that echolocation, though clearly a form of perception has no
equivalent in its operation to any human sense. However, most humans can tell a bit
about location and distance through hearing already (Blauert 1997; Rosenblum et al.
2000) so we can partly imagine what having echolocation would be like.11
Moreover, there is evidence that humans have or can develop a ‘natural’
echolocation ability, in particular research has shown the potential of this ability
in a segment of the blind population that ‘‘has learned to sense silent objects in the
environment simply by generating clicks with their tongues and mouths and then
listening to the returning echoes’’ (Thaler et al. 2011: 1).12 This ability can now be
enhanced by the use of devices for sending the sounds (Hughes 2001). Thus,
communication problems arise not necessarily because humans lack this ability,
rather it could be argued that communication problems arise given that humans use
a different range of frequencies and/or use external devices to their inherent
biological make-up, which might not enable us to perceive the same aspects of the
world as bats do. Thus, even if this suggests that communication with a bat may be
possible, albeit within certain limits of understanding, this partial understanding13
might be possible only because echolocation is based on a sense that we do share
with bats, namely hearing (Stroffregen and Pittenger 1995). However, if we were
given a totally new sense about which those lacking it knew nothing, as in the H.
G. Wells story then, it is less clear just how much understanding would be possible.
In other words, certain human enhancements might lead to a situation where the
enhanced individual and the unenhanced may not share much of their lifeworld.
Thus, while having a new sense might not necessarily lead to communication
problems between the enhanced and the unenhanced, some types of these sense
11 Humans have also external devices that enable them to processes sound information in an analogous
form to bat’s echolocation (e.g. sonar technology).
12 Interestingly, Thaler and colleagues note that in early blind echolocation experts, the visual cortex is
activated in response to auditory stimuli.
13 In addition, partial understanding might be necessary but not sufficient for the type of meaningful
communication that is needed in certain spheres of human communication.
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enhancements might. There is at least a case to me made further examination is
warranted.
Cognition (Including Memory)
Our cognitive capabilities, including the ways in which we acquire, select, represent
and retain information and later use it to guide behaviour, have been seen in the past
as superior to those from other living organisms (Dennet 1978; Savulescu 2009).
Moreover a great many of these features that we use to define our human condition
(such as analytical and conceptual thought, different degrees of communication,
awareness of ourselves across time and space and the capability of feeling and
emotions) are dependent on the particular ways our brains are connected and
functioning (Farah and Heberlein 2007). In addition to this our cognitive processes
are seen as constitutive of our being and life (Sacks 1985).
Our thesis here is that some forms of cognitive enhancement could pose
communication problems between the enhanced and the unenhanced. Some support
from this thesis is that the different cognition abilities humans have in comparison
with other living organisms already pose communication limitations between
humans and other non-human animals. Moreover, there are cases in which even
among humans differences in brain chemistry, anatomy or similar bring significant
differences in the way certain humans know the world. Brain damage and neuro
degenerative diseases have also changed the way people experience the world
(Sacks 1985), for instance there are cases of people who after accidents have lost the
capacity to recognize faces, objects, movement, and music (without being deaf); or
cases in which certain neuronal disturbances (such as those caused by epilepsy)
have made people experience enhanced feelings of spirituality and beauty.14 Some
of these differences already make us question our understanding of the world they
see and know.
Some good examples can be found in Oliver Sacks’s book The man who mistook
his wife for a hat and other clinical tales (1985). An interesting case is the one he
describes in his story of the twins who happened to have an almost limitless memory
and with this the way in which memories are retrieved. The twins, when asked how
they managed to hold so much in their minds (e.g. a three hundred figure digit),
answered that they ‘see it’.
A box of matches on their table fell, and discharged its contents on the floor:
‘111,’ they both cried simultaneously; and then, in a murmur, John [one of the
twins] said ‘37’. Michael [the other twin] repeated this, John said it a third
time and stopped. I counted the matches—it took me some time—and there
were 111.
‘How could you count the matches so quickly?’ I asked. ‘We didn’t count,’
they said. ‘We saw the 111.’
‘And why did you murmur ‘‘37,’’ and repeat it three times?’ I asked the twins.
They said in unison, ‘37, 37, 37, 111.’ (Sacks 1985: Ch 23)
14 Some researchers have argued that epilectic individuals with seizures in certain areas of the brain can
have intense, spiritual experiences and bursts of creativity (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1999).
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Sacks’s tells us in his book that he founded puzzling not only the fact that they
could see the ‘111-ness’ in such a flash, but that they factored the number 111
without having any method or ‘knowing’ (in the ordinary way) what a factor
means.15
The second anecdote he narrates about the twins was a time when while sitting in
a corner together locked in what seemed to be a singular, purely numerical
conversation.
John would say a number—a six-figure number. Michael would catch the
number, nod, smile and seem to savor it. Then he, in turn, would say another
six-figure number, and now it was John who received, and appreciated it
richly. They looked, at first, like two connoisseurs wine-tasting, sharing rare
tastes, rare appreciations. I sat still, unseen by them, mesmerized, bewildered.
What were they doing? What on earth was going on? I could make nothing of
it. It was perhaps a sort of game, but it had a gravity and an intensity, a sort of
serene and meditative and almost holy intensity, which I had never seen in any
ordinary game before, and which I certainly had never seen before in the
usually agitated and distracted twins. I contented myself with noting down the
numbers they uttered—the numbers that manifestly gave them such delight,
and which they ‘contemplated’, savored, shared, in communion (Sacks 1985:
Ch 23).
Sacks invites us to ask ourselves whether the numbers had any meaning or
universal sense, or (if any at all) a merely whimsical or private sense, like the secret
and silly ‘languages’ brothers and sisters sometimes work out for themselves. Kurt
Go¨del, has discussed how ‘‘mathematical objects are as concrete, as stable, and as
well-behaved as physical objects, and that the axioms do indeed govern their
behaviour. In this respect, mathematical objects are neither illusory, nor ephemeral;
neither figment, nor allegory. They are real ‘‘(Ravitch 1968: Ch 2). If this does
occur, it is possible that only those who can understand this being in the world as
numbers can experience a ‘‘strange and precise communication too’’ (Sacks 1985:
Ch 23). However, such a world does not seem to be the world most of us know and
as such not a world we can easily grasp.
Another famous case is the one presented by Alexander Luria (1987), in his book
The Mind of a Mnemonist: a Little Book About a Vast Memory. Luria describes in
this book the case of a mnemonist patient, that is to say someone with a remarkable
capacity and durability of memory, he calls S. S’s incredible memory capacity
prevented him not only from reading, abstracting and understanding simple stories
(as details would create more details until his mind was a complete chaos), but more
importantly it prevented him from establishing meaningful communication with
other human beings. Presumably, this was because others could not grasp what it
was like to be saturated by so many details even in engaging in simple tasks.
15 Sacks’s has already put them to the test about their understanding of simple calculations such as
multiplication or division of which they seem to have none. However, they had divided spontaneously ‘‘a
compound number into three equal parts’’.
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These examples aim to highlight the possible communication problems that we
could encounter when human enhancement comes in the form of enhanced
cognition (such as memory enhancement).
These three different aspects –body, senses, cognition—suggest that certain
neurological and bodily differences between humans inhibit at least some
meaningful communication. In the next section we will outline some examples of
human enhancement interventions that are aimed at changing our bodies, our senses
and our brains.
Enhancement Technologies and Interventions
It could be argued that all forms of technology-human interaction have the potential
to change the way we perceive and understand the world (Haggard 2010), but only a
few cases seem to really have the potential to disrupt meaningful communication.
Technological interventions that tinker directly with our brains, for instance, do
seem to bring something new compared with other kinds of human-technology
interactions. This is because the human brain is considered the human organ with
the highest level of complexity and is the most dynamic and sensitive organ that we
have (Society for Neuroscience 2008a). It is the organ that most of us would
consider makes us unique, not only because we associate it with our identity and our
conscious perception of the world, others and ourselves (Glannon 2007; Hayles
1999; National Research Council 2008; Varela et al. 1991),16 but also because it
orchestrates all our body activities, functions and capabilities, including memories,
emotions, affective and cognitive capacities of reasoning and decision-making
(Society for Neuroscience 2008a, b; Berger et al. 2005). As such, interventions of
the brain will probably have more far reaching consequences for human interaction
(Berger et al. 2008) and for human self-perception and understanding (Farah 2010),
than any other intervention in our body.
The following are some examples of human enhancement interventions that
could potentially disrupt our communication processes:
• Pharmaceutical interventions: generally speaking pharmaceutical interventions
alter the chemistry of our brains. They do so by mimicking neurotransmitters,
the chemical messengers neurons use to communicate with each other (Society
for Neuroscience 2008a). Let us use the example of stimulants drugs which
affect norepinephrine and dopamine receptors. Dopamine, for instance, carries
messages in the brain about feeling good. When used for human enhancement,
some stimulant drugs have psychological effects that range from temporal
altered thinking process, synaesthesia and altered sense of time and sense of self,
to long-term psycho-emotional effects. Some other drugs have shown some
improvements for episodic and working memory, as well as concentration.
16 For instance, generally we believe that human beings see with their eyes; however, it does not matter
which sense someone is using to gather data, rather it is how the brain interprets it what counts (‘‘you
don’t see with your eyes, you see with your brain’’ (Bach-y-Rita and Kercel 2003).
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• Brain stimulation techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),
and brain deep stimulation (DBS)17: When used for human enhancement, certain
brain stimulation techniques have the potential to stimulate areas of the brain
activating certain emotions or behaviours that are not characteristic of the person
in question and that in some cases could produce feelings that go beyond what
we as humans have been so far able to relate to (Heinrichs 2012; Klaming and
Haselager (2010); Baylis 2011). For instance, Helmut Dubiel, a philosopher and
author of Deep in the brain: Living with Parkinson’s disease (Dubiel 2006), at a
conference on deep brain stimulation in 2010 mentioned that with the
stimulation he has experienced happiness as never before, and that it was so
suddenly that he described as not human. This highlights the possibility that
certain interventions to our nervous systems could enable us to experience things
that we generally do not categorize as human. Brain stimulations techniques can
also be used for enhancement of human sensing capabilities and cognition
(Farah and Wolpe 2004; Benali et al. 2011; Hamani et al. 2008).
• Genetic interventions: The way the human brain is wired up and constituted has
a great genetic component (Society for Neuroscience 2008a). If in the future
genetic interventions could selectively turn off or on certain genes related to our
neuro-traits or we could engineer to include certain non-human traits in our
genomes it is likely that the set of capacities current humans experience could
drastically change (like being able to see a wider selection of the light spectrum
or hearing different frequencies). Genetic interventions could also be used to
change our bodily features, for instance by genetically engineering different
features or numbers of limbs. One futuristic example would be to genetically
engineer a human-animal chimera. If such intervention were to change so much
our phonic and auditory system, how can we be certain that we would have the
same capabilities to speak and listen to sounds the way we do nowadays?
• Brain computer/machine interfaces and cognitive/body prostheses: here we are
referring to those that do not only improve or rehabilitate function or cognition
(Donoghue 2002, 2008; National Research Council 2008), but about the sort of
implants used for human enhancement, such as those that could enable new
senses as well as new modes of perception (Coenen et al. 2009; Berger et al.
2005).18 Or implants that affect our bodies such as those providing us with an
extra pair of hands, or a tail. Arguably, people using a cane already experience
an extended body. Similarly modern day prosthetics, including implants,
embedded devices (like pacemakers) and wearable devices cannot be seen just
as inanimate and separate objects from our bodies.19 Now if we have prostheses
that enable us to basically change our whole body, our exploration and
17 Neurostimulation have already been used beyond just improving mood and mental function in patients
with neuropsychiatric disorders, into enhancing certain features in normal people (Snyder et al. 2003).
18 The computer game industry, for example funds many brain-computer interfaces designed to enable
users to directly control their avatars in ‘‘virtual worlds’’ (Waters 2008). Other relevant non-medical
arenas for the use of BCI are the automotive, telecommunication and robotics industries (F. Berger et al.
2008).
19 For a case portraying this view see http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-innovation/ethics-in-
the-age-of-acceleration/2012/07/13/gJQAzVDUiW_story.html.
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knowledge of the world might also be altered. These ‘enhanced’ bodies could
potentially pose communication problems inasmuch as they enable the enhanced
individuals to explore and being in the world in ways that might be significantly
different to those of unenhanced individuals. How much can I really grasp the
lifeworld of a human that has three pairs of hands? A less fictional case, could be
that of soldiers using exoskeletons, how much the perceptions enabled by their
new bodies (i.e. being stronger or faster) affect their interaction with others and
their environments? At this point in time we might not be able to assess the
degree and scope of the communication problems these human enhancements
might bring along, but that does not make less important that we start discussing
the possibility that such changes might bring.
These are some possible examples of the kind of human enhancement
interventions that could alter our brains and bodies in unprecedented ways and
with it disrupt the ways in which we perceive, sense, and know our environment and
ourselves, thereby challenging the possibility of meaningful communication. Maybe
human enhancements that add one new capability, such as echolocation would still
leave room for reaching partial understanding, but imagine what would happen if
we keep adding different kinds of new perceptions to the ones known by humans.
We might reach a stage in which the lifeworld of techno-enhanced beings (i.e.
posthumans) would be so different to the human lifeworld that it would seem absurd
to speak of such a thing as a common world. The same could occur if we engineered
babies with different non-human new ways to explore the world.
Some Ethical Considerations
We certainly do not need to think of exotic implants to see the difficulties that
certain enhancement technologies could pose for reaching meaning and shared
understanding.20 How much these different ways in which we can live in the world
(body), perceive it (senses) and know about it (cognition) change our lifeworlds and
whether it elicits or not a communication divide might be empirical questions.
However, what is hard to deny is that certain uses of enhancement technologies
could indeed challenge meaningful human communication, as they are likely to
significantly change our bodily features, senses and cognitive capabilities, in
addition to the changes to our social and cultural lifeworlds.
Here we want to establish the importance of taking seriously the possibility of a
communication disruption by highlighting the ethical importance of communication
as such. The communication difficulties we have highlighted are of considerable
moral importance because of the role human communication has for humans as
relational individuals.
20 Presumably we can try to come up with ways to translate different experiences in order to
communicate to others experiences that otherwise they cannot experience. But this takes us to Nagels
point in which I might reach a partial understanding that is good enough to reach certain level of
communication, but the more ones share lifeworld diverge from others the more likely meaningful
communication would be impaired.
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One ethical concern is that such a divide could bring a kind of hermeneutic crisis
(Edgar 2009; Habermas 2003). One of the main reasons for a shared lifeworld being
crucial in human communication, is that it enables us to secure a horizon ‘‘within
which [we as humans] can refer to one and the same objective world’’ (Habermas
2000: 315). That is why communication is not only easier between people with
similar experiences; but it might be the case that meaningful communication is only
possible between those who share a minimal reference lifeworld (what this minimal
reference entails is outside the scope of this paper). A hermeneutic crisis then would
imply the possibility of meaningful communication being eroded. This would
include an erosion of the possibility for discussing and deliberating about the
implications and applications of new technological interventions as well as the
legitimate uses of them. Furthermore, when meaningful communication is not
possible anymore, the basis for social interaction, social engagement and
cooperation, would not be possible to sustain or even try to sustain.
Another related ethical concern deals with empathy. The epistemic form of
subjectivity deals with the limits on the understandability or knowability of various
facts about conscious experience (Nagel 1974). That is why only creatures capable
of having similar experiences can understand their ‘what-it-is-likeness’ in the
empathetic sense. Generally speaking, empathy is regarded as the ability to take the
perspective of another individual; that is, imaginatively assuming one or more of the
other individual‘s mental states (Goldman 1993). In common language empathy is
seen as the ability to put oneself in another‘s shoes, in order to understand the
emotions and feelings of the other. Empathy is important because it can play a
significant role in motivation and in people‘s ability to show moral concern for
others. Having different and diverging lifeworlds, as implied by the kind of
communication divide described here, might shift our perception and moral concern
towards those who do not share our particular lifeworld. Thus, it can be argued that
sharing a lifeworld is not only needed for meaningful communication, but also to
come to agreement and understanding of moral propositions (Haidt 2001) as well as
to help us decide whom and what to include within our circle of moral concern. An
example of this is the way we more readily emphatise with the suffering of other
humans in comparison with the suffering of other non-human animals. However,
before we can expand our circle of moral concern beyond the human, as suggested
by many ethicists, it seems we still need to work harder in empathising with those
individuals who do not share our beliefs, cultures, socio-economic status (i.e. gays,
immigrants, addicts, and people living below the poverty line). Imagine then
introducing even more radically different ways of experiencing the world. That is
why we argue that a communication divide as the one suggested here could bring
even more worrisome consequences.
One more ethical concern has to do with the idea that for the first time certain
neurotechnologies are enabling a third party to, in principle, bypass the peripheral
nervous system—the usual way in which we communicate information—gaining
then, direct access to the center of our thoughts, intentions, feelings and knowledge
(Wolpe et al. 2005). How could this become a threat to communication? We
communicate because we let others to know about our mental life, which is not the
same than others having direct access to it. If others can access the world of our
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thoughts without us being able to control what we want to communicate to others,
can we still call that human communication?
The last ethical consideration we want to mention here is the transcending power
we encounter through communication, particularly when we reach an understanding
with one another about ourselves and the world (Habermas 2003). Reaching
understanding can be conceived as a mechanism that socializes and individuates in
one act. Communication contains ‘‘the possibility of universal understanding within
the shell of the most individual expression’’ (Habermas 2000: 187). This is one of
the most interesting paradoxes of human communication; it bridges and awakes a
feeling of unity, while at the same time it also inherently divides, as it entails a
process of individuation.
Human communication as was mentioned before is important because it allows
us to engage with the world and share meaning with others. A shared human
lifeworld has enabled us to cooperate and communicate in more advanced and
adaptive ways. Certain technological interventions could threaten communication,
as we do not know the effects they could have on an individual’s life, inner world
and in the way he or she interacts and understands the world and other human
beings. If we acknowledge the pivotal role human communication plays for the
individual and society, then the ways in which human enhancement interventions
might impact communication calls for more seriously ethical deliberation.
Conclusion
The special status of human communication comes from the fact that it is more than
merely a passive flow of information within a system. Human communication
enables us to convey intentions and meaning, allowing us to express our inner states,
and establish relationships with others and our environment.
Given that our brain is the organ that allows us to understand and create
frameworks to engage with the world and this engagement comes, by and large,
through our bodies via our senses technological applications that directly tinker
and alter our brains and bodies call for more ethical discussion. While there are
positive outcomes that can be reached by using these neurotechnological and
other technological interventions, such as bridging communication gaps and
improve channels of communication between individuals with different biolog-
ical human realities, this does not necessarily mean that it will always enable us
to communicate in humane or meaningful ways. As such, we also need to be
cautious with the ways our shared human lifeworld is changed and challenged by
new uses of technology (e.g. human enhancement), as we could end up creating
a communication divide between ‘enhanced’ and ‘unenhanced’ individuals, in
which no meaningful human communication would be possible or would be very
difficult to attain. We need to think about technological interventions in terms of
the impacts they have on the brain and body, positive or negative, and
importantly providing a framework for thoughtfully engineering their direct as
well as their emergent effects.
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